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When a husband and wife with children decide to terminate their
marriage,' they are confronted with the necessity not only of arranging
their own affairs, but also of establishing a new life plan for themselves
as parents. Although the precise effects of marital breakdown on
children may be subject to dispute,' no one would suggest that such
effects are predominantly positive. The primary objective of the par-
ties involved, therefore, should be to minimize the adverse impact which
the situation will have upon the children.
Under existing law, when a marriage is terminated, the state,
acting through its courts, assumes the role of parens patriae3 and deter-
mines who shall have custody of the children and on what conditions. 4
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1. Nearly one out of every two marriages in the United States ends in divorce,
and one million children are thrust into single-parent homes each year. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-20, No. 287,
MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRtANGEMENTS: MARCH 1975, at 2-5 (1975); Keniston,
The Emptying Family, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1976, at 37, col. 2. It is estimated that
due to the increasing incidence of divorce, two out of every five children born in the
1970s will live with only one parent for at least part of their childhoods. Id.
2. For extensive reviews of the literature from the behavioral sciences, see Brad-
brook, The Relevance of Psychological and Psychiatric Studies to the Future Develop-
ment of the Laws Governing the Settlement of Inter-Parental Child C'ustody Disputes,
11 J. FAM. L. 557 (1971); Ellsworth & Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody
Adjudication: An Effort to Rely on Social Science Data in Formulating Legal Policies,
4 L. & Soc'Y REv. 167 (1969). See also J. DEsPERT, CHILDREN OF DIVORCE (1953).
3. For a discussion of the historical development of the court's role as parens pa-
triae, see Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pt. 1), 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 423-25 (1964);
Note, 33 FOP.DHAM L. REV. 726, 727-28 (1965).
4. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4351 (West Supp. 1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13
(Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 552.16 (1967); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1964); PA. STAT.
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Where the divorce involves such bitterness between the former marital
partners that even a minimal level of cooperation is precluded, inter-
vention by the state in the interest of the child is unquestionably justi-
fied. Where, however, as is often the case, there exists a residue of
goodwill and trust between husband and wife on matters affecting their
children, or at least a prevailing determination to make their own deci-
sions about such matters, the necessity for state paternalism is less clear.
In such situations the parents will often have executed a separation
agreement providing for custody, visitation, and support, and establish-
ing the ground rules for the resolution of future disputes." In spite
of the benefit such a contract may provide to the child of the broken
home, the courts are generally free to affirm or ignore any separation
agreement as they determine the appropriate legal framework for the
child's post-divorce existence.6
It is the purpose of this Article to propose a new mechanism for
determining and protecting the interests of the child of divorce. The
proposal involves three basic elements: the use of a family counseling
specialist to assist in drafting a separation agreement, the participation
of the same specialist in a required mediation process when disputes
arise under the agreement, and the submission to arbitration of matters
which cannot be resolved through the mediation process. This pro-
posal is predicated on the assumption that it is the parents, irrespective
of the failure of their own relationship, who have the primary responsi-
bility for bringing up their child. Therefore, the interests of the child
should be viewed from the perspective of the parents as far as is reason-
ably possible. A necessary implication of this view is that state partici-
pation in the decision-making process should be minimal; specifically,
ANN. tit. 23, § 15 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.050 (Supp. 1975).
The child must reside within the state in order for the court to have jurisdiction to
determine custody. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring); Bachman v. Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, "136 N.E.2d 866, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956).
But see UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICION Acr, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
See also People ex rel. Robert C. MM v. Ann Jeanette NN, 50 App. Div. 2d 1033,
376 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1975) (mem.) (court in child's new state of residence can overturn
initial custody determination).
5. See H. CLARK, THE LAw OF DOMEsTlC RELATIONS IN THE UNITrr STATES §
16.10 (1968).
6. Daily v. Daily, 175 Ark. 161, 164, 298 S.W. 1012, 1013 (1927); Carson v.
Carson, 120 Ind. App. 1, 8-9, 89 N.E.2d 555, 559 (1950); Van Dyke v. Van Dyke,
278 App. Div. 446, 448, 106 N.Y.S.2d 237, 240 (1951); Commonwealth ex rel. Traeger
V. Ritting, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 515, 517, afrd, 206 Pa. Super. 446, 213 A.2d 681 (1965).
If accepted by the court granting the divorce, the separation agreement may merge into
the divorce decree, or it may continue to subsist as a separate contract between the




it will be argued that courts must begin to accord far greater respect
to the wishes of parents as expressed in separation agreements.
It is to be emphasized that the suggestions made herein do not
rest upon any sociological or psychological theory that parents, by vir-
tue of that status, are better able than anyone else to make decisions
affecting their children. On the contrary, it is recognized that freedom
to decide entails freedom to decide wrongly. The premise of this
Article is that this is a risk run by all parents and that the occurrence
of divorce neither negates the obligations of parenthood nor justifies
the imposition of an "objective" notion of the child's best interests by
the state.7 As background to the presentation of the mediation-arbitra-
tion proposal, the introductory portions of the Article will discuss the
nature and sources of post-marital disputes, attempt to identify the
values which the optimal method of resolving such disputes should pre-
serve, and evaluate the two most prevalent means of dispute settlement
in terms of those values.
SOURCES OF DISPUTES INVOLVING CHILDREN ARISING
UNDER SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
Since the separation agreement forms the basis of a new life plan
for the children of divorced parents, its provisions are normally compre-
7. The proposal presented here has a theoretical basis in the work of Dr. Law-
rence Kubie. Kubie has recommended that disagreements regarding post-separation ar-
rangements be subject to committee resolution. Specifically, he has proposed that
[(Upon separation or divorce the parents agree that the child's interests are
paramount, and that neither of them shall have an exclusive right to custody.
They accept the responsibility to attempt to decide together by mutual agree-
ment every question that has a bearing on the welfare of their child or chil-
dren, e.g., where the child shall live and with whom and for how long, where
the child shall go to school and the kind of school, what kind of medical or
psychological help the child may have if needed, what kind of vacations to
spend where and with whom, etc.
If and whenever the parents cannot reach an agreement on any matter
of concern to the child, they agree to submit the issue to a committee which
they themselves choose at the time they make the agreement, and to accept
unconditionally the committee's decisions, and to be guided by it. The com-
mittee will act at the instance of either parent, and the failure of the other to
present his side when given the opportunity does not make the committee's
decision ineffective. Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced
Parents: A New Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197, 1198 (1964).
Dr. Kubie's proposals are discussed in detail in Note, Committee Decision of Child
Custody Disputes and the Tudicial Test of "Best Interests," 73 YALE L.. 1201 (1964).
This Article, while drawing on Dr. Kubie's ideas, seeks to provide a measure of
procedural certainty, the lack of which has largely prevented practical implementation
of his suggestions. One commentator, for example, has suggested that Dr. Kubie's pro-
posal has not been widely adopted because his "method is so complicated and expensive
in terms of professional time that it appears applicable only to the very wealthy." Der-
deyn, Child Custody Consultation, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 791, 794 (1975). At
least one court, however, has considered Dr. Kubie's suggestion in granting limited rec-
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hensive. The fundamental issue to be dealt with, of course, is that of
custody. In addition, most separation agreements provide for visitation
rights for the noncustodial parent, education and religious training,
health care, vacations, residential restrictions, and other special consid-
erations such as notice and visitation in the event of illness." The docu-
ment should also specify the amount of child support to be paid and
provide for supplemental payments for major expenditures (medical
costs or college tuition, for example) and emergencies. 9
Regardless of the comprehensiveness of the agreement, disputes
are virtually inevitable, given both the nature of the agreement and the
nature of the situation. Certain disputes can be anticipated. For
example, the agreement may provide that new visitation arrangements
will be made when the child reaches a designated age. Anticipating
that they may be unable to reach an agreement at that time, the parties
may make advance provision for some mechanism for fixing the terms
of the new arrangement. 10
The frequency of unanticipated disputes is likely to vary with the
degree of specificity with which the separation agreement is drawn.
Broad language open to varied interpretations is a source of particular
difficulty. An examination of suggested provisions in a widely.used
form book illustrates the problem. One form, for example, provides
that the husband have "every reasonable opportunity to visit the
children"; that he give "proper notice" to the custodian prior to each
visit; that such visits "shall not interfere with previous plans made by
ognition to arbitration awards affecting children. See Sheets v. Sheets, 22 App. Div.
2d 176, 177, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320, 323 (1964) (discussed at notes 64-70 infra and accom-
panying text).
8. 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS xix (2d
rev. ed. 1967); see DeFreitas v. DePreitas, 133 Cal. 2d 769, 285 P.2d 111 (1955) (cus-
tody); Jackson v. Jackson, 181 Kan. 1, 309 P.2d 705 (1957) (religious training); Van
Horn v. Van Horn, 196 App. Div. 472, 188 N.Y.S. 98 (1921) (education); McDonald
v. McDonald, 197 Ore. 272, 253 P.2d 249 (1953) (visitation rights).
9. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 8, at xx; see Jackson v. Jackson, 290 N.Y. 512, 516,
49 N.E.2d 988, 990 (1943) (where husband and wife have fixed an amount for child
support in the separation agreement, the court will treat that amount as the proper meas-
ure of support). Lindey also suggests that consideration be given to such questions
as whether the husband's (or wife's) obligation will survive his death and be binding
on the estate and whether the husband should agree to leave a specified sum in his
will or part of his net estate to his children (or wife). 1 A. LDnMY, supra note 8,
at xx-xxi; see Sonnicksen v. Sonnicksen, 45 Cal. App. 2d 46, 52, 113 P.2d 495, 499
(1941) (enforcing a separation agreement under which husband and wife agreed that
upon the death of one, all property of deceased would go to survivor, and upon death
of survivor to their children).
10. See, e.g., 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 8, § 14, at 21 (suggesting the use of arbitra-
tion for the settlement of anticipated disputes).
[Vol. 1976:911
MEDIATION-ARBITRATION
the wife for the child's benefit"; and that where "circumstances" make
it "impossible or impractical" for the non-custodial spouse to visit, he
shall have the right to have the child visit him." The potential for
further confusing an inherently complex and delicate situation is
self-evident.
Such language is found as well in the provisions dealing with
the payment of money, which normally provoke the greatest number
of disagreements.12 For example, a spouse may be obligated to pay
the children directly for their support and maintenance and to provide
them with a "regular and suitable allowance."' 3  The parties may be
obligated to agree on a summer camp, private school or college and,
further, on the amount of expense for such facility to be absorbed by
the non-custodial spouse.' 4 The non-custodial spouse may undertake
to pay "the cost of sending the children to college" and define costs
as consisting of "tuition fees, plus a reasonable living allowance to be
agreed upon between the parties."' 5  Moreover, even those provisions
which appear to be wholly unambiguous can often give rise to disputes.
There may be disagreement, for example, as to whether psychiatric
expenses, cosmetic surgery, orthodontia and the like were intended to
be included within a clause requiring one spouse to pay the child's
"medical, dental, surgical, nursing and hospital expenses."1 6
It should be obvious that the smooth operation of a separation
agreement containing such indefinite terms requires considerable good
11. Id. at 13-14 (Form 14.08).
12. The authors have personally reviewed all the marital arbitration records on file
with the New York Regional Office of the American Arbitration Association for the
years 1973 and 1974 [hereinafter cited as 1973-74 Survey]. The standard records in-
cluded in the file contain the names of the parties, a copy of the demand served on
the respondent by the party seeking arbitration, lists of the arbitrators submitted for
the parties' approval, a copy of the separation agreement, and a copy of the award.
Correspondence among the American Arbitration Association, the arbitrator and the
parties, notes made by the arbitrator, and briefs prepared by a party are occasionally
found in the files. The process of determining the specific facts of a case is therefore
an uncertain one, dependent largely on inference and deduction.
The files are not available for public inspection. Special access is sometimes
granted to persons who, like the authors, wish to use the material for scholarly research
and agree to preserve the anonymity of the parties.
Of the 39 cases considered during those years, 21 raised questions of child support
(sometimes in conjunction with other matters). The majority of these were claims for
non-payment; in eleven of these non-payment cases, however, demands for upward or
downward modification of support payments were also made.
13. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 8, § 15, at 15-40.
14. See, e.g., id. § 15, at 15-17 to 15-18 (Form 15.10), 15-63 (Form 15.36).
15. Id. § 15, at 15-17 to 15-18 (Form 15.10) (emphasis added).
16. Id.
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faith on the part of the parents. A slight unforeseen turn of events
may destroy the delicate balance of interests between the parties, ren-
dering agreed-upon provisions inequitable or unworkable. It is essen-
tial, therefore, that the means of resolving disputes arising under these
agreements be designed to prevent the exacerbation of the misunder-
standing or ill feeling which led to the dispute.
JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES ARISING
UNDER SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
So long as the nuclear family remains intact, the state ordinarily
refrains from interfering in parental decision-making unless the conduct
of the parents falls below some minimal level of societal acceptabil-
ity. 17  As mentioned earlier, however, any disputes with regard to
family matters arising after a divorce or separation are normally re-
solved by a court."" In these proceedings, the statutes of most states
provide that the predominant criterion to be considered is "the best
interests" of the child.' 9 Unfortunately, the courts have experienced
considerable difficulty in determining the relevant factors to be
weighed in applying this ostensibly objective test 20 and have tended to
17. For example, the Georgia Code gives the juvenile courts jurisdiction over a "de-
prived" child, defined as a child who is "without proper parental care or control, sub-
sistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his physi-
cal, mental or emotional health, or morals . . . ." GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24A-301 (a) (1)
(C); 24A-401(h)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975). But see Alsager v. District Court, 406 F.
Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), in which the court struck down portions of an Iowa statute
allowing for termination of parental rights on the grounds that the standards for termi-
nation were too vague to give fair warning of what parental conduct was proscribed,
permitted arbitrary and discriminatory terminations, and inhibited exercise of parents'
fundamental right to family integrity.
18. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying teit.
19. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402 (1970); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.55.205 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-42 (Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 61.13 (Supp. 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (Supp. 1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
452.375 (Vernon 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (1974); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
240 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. § 3109.04 (Page Supp. 1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-115 (1962); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.09.190 (Supp. 1975). See also ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 35 (1959) (as
their safety and well-being may require); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1211 (1962) (as from
the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case shall be reasonable); IDAHO
CODE § 32-705 (1963) (as may seem necessary or proper); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-
5-23 (1972) (as may seem equitable and just); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (1968)
(as shall be most conducive to their benefit); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1971)
(as may seem necessary or proper); S.D. COMP. LAws § 25-4-45 (1967) (as may seem
necessary or proper); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (1975) (as court shall deem expedient).
20. For a general discussion of the factors considered in awarding custody, see
Clark, supra note 5, § 17.4; Foster & Freed, supra note 3, at 438-43.
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rely instead on a variety of presumptions." These rules have been
criticized by social scientists2" and are indicative of the difficulty courts
have in obtaining and assimilating the information necessary to make
reasoned judgments.28  Yet, only minimal modifications-such as in
camera interviews with the child24 or special investigations 2 5 -have
been made to facilitate the court's paternal function.
21. See, e.g., Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 1398-99, 121 N.W.
2d 216, 220 (1963); Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va. 259, 270-71, 49 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1948)
(children of tender years should be awarded to the mother); Beck v. Beck, 175 Neb.
108, 111-12, 120 N.W.2d 585, 589 (1963) (a wife found guilty of adultery is an unfit
custodian as matter of law). One commentator has argued that, in order to promote
uniformity, the presumptions which may legitimately be indulged should be set forth
in a statute. Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 2, at 202-03.
22. See, e.g., Fain, Our Child Custody Laws and Policies-Are They in Need of
Revision or Change?, ABA FAMILY LAW SEcTIoN, PROCEEDINGS 29 (1963), quoted in
Ellsworth & Levy, supra note 2, at 218 n.3 1:
Too often these so-called generalizations or cliches are used by lawyers and
judges with basically no real investigation or thought given to what is to be
the best interests of the child. Moreover, there are often honest differences of
opinion concerning a fit custodial parent or the best interests of children. When
one considers the fact that our divorce judges have a wide and almost uncon-
trolled discretion in these matters, the problem is compounded. The exercise
of this discretion cannot be considered simply as a legal function, no matter
how learned in the law a judge may be. We must recognize that the discretion
exercised by a trial judge is far less a product of his learning than of his per-
sonality and temperament, his background and interests, his biases and preju-
dices, conscious or unconscious. Hence, it is both necessary and practicable
to attempt to give more definite substance to the generalizations that creep onto
our laws and into our cases.
See generally J. DESPERT, supra note 2, at 192-94.
23. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CoNTEMp. PROB. 226, 257-58 (1975); Watson, The Children
of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 55, 62
(1969).
24. See, e.g., Ex parte Leu, 240 Mich. 240, 248-49, 215 N.W. 384, 386 (1927);
Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270, 272, 247 N.E.2d 659, 661, 299 N.Y.S.2d 842, 844
(1969). See also Krieger v. Krieger, 59 Idaho 301, 305-06, 81 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1938)
(any examination of the child to determine his parental preference should take place
out of the presence and hearing of the parents); Douglas v. Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172,
184, 331 P.2d 840, 845 (1958) (trial judge who interviews child must state in his deci-
sion the child's expressed preference and the extent to which the child's statement was
taken into consideration). Contra, Raper v. Berrier, 246 N.C. 193, 195, 97 S.E.2d 782,
784 (1957) (court may privately question child only with consent of the parties). In-
terestingly, one court has denied a panel of arbitrators the authority to conduct a confi-
dential interview with a child whose custody they were to determine. Nestel v. Nestel,
38 App. Div. 2d 942, 943, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (1972).
25. Generally, the court may order an independent investigation in any domestic
relations case. However, unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the report of the special
investigator can be considered by the court only if it is entered into evidence and the
investigator is available to the parties as a witness. Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431,
435-36, 144 P.2d 592, 595 (1943); Kesseler v. Kesseler, 10 N.Y.2d 445, 455, 180 N.E.2d
402, 407, 225 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8, remittitur amended, 11 N.Y.2d 716, 181 N.E.2d 220, 225
N.Y.S.2d 996 (1962); see Leavell, Custody Disputes and the Proposed Model, 2 GA.
L. REv. 162, 185-87 (1968). The inability of the courts to seek useful outside help
Vol. 1976:911"1
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In addition to this substantive uncertainty, it is felt that the judicial
procedure is inherently ill-equipped to deal with post-marital matters.
In particular, judicial resolution of child-related disputes fails to incor-
porate three important "value preferences" which an optimal mecha-
nism should be designed to preserve. The first of these is family
autonomy. Parents have, and should have, the primary responsibility
for raising their children. Judges as a group possess no qualities that
make them inherently more capable than parents of making intelligent
decisions as to a child's best interests after the termination of a
marriage. On the contrary, because they brought the child into the
world, have far more knowledge of the child's needs and desires, and
carry the financial and emotional burden of raising the child, the
parents ought to enjoy a presumption in favor of their judgment.2 6
Moreover, this is a pluralistic society. Except in the most extreme
cases, the state ought not to impose its own (or an individual judge's)
set of parental values in preference to those of the natural parents. To
do so is to ignore the legitimate ethnic, religious and cultural differ-
ences among individuals which this society has traditionally fostered.2 7
Despite the breakdown in the marital relationship, the preserva-
tion of family autonomy demands that parents retain the right to make
decisions affecting the upbringing of their children. To the extent that
parents, even after a good faith effort, cannot agree between them-
selves on what is best for their children, they should at least have the
without the consent of the parties would restrict the effectiveness of a court-appointed
child development consultant such as that proposed in Derdeyn, Supra note 7. In addi-
tion, as one commentator has observed, "there appears to be a spirit of hostility
[in the courts] towards these [experts'] reports as such and a failure to appreciate that
the insights of staff and professional people may be of real service in arriving at what
actually is to the best interests of the child whose custody is at issue." 2 H. FOSTER
& D. FREED, LAW AND THE FAMILY-NEw YORK § 29:30 (1966).
26. The courts have generally held that the parents of a child, if they are found
to be fit, are preferred as custodians over non-parents. See, e.g., In re Guardianship
of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 92, 265 P.2d 888, 889 (1954). In one study advocating general
codification of the judicial presumptions invoked in custody cases, it was suggested that
the absence of reliable alternative standards made it particularly urgent that the pre-
sumption in favor of parental custody be given statutory status. Ellsworth & Levy, supra
note 2, at 204-07.
27. The judicial resolution of a particular child-related conflict may constitute not
only the imposition of an external set of values, but also a means of punishing a parent
whose values the judge does not share. For an example of such interference, see Painter
v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966), in
which the child was placed in the home of his grandparents rather than in his father's
"unstable, unconventional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating ... "
household. Id. at 1396, 140 N.W.2d at 156. See also Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng.
Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817), the celebrated English case in which Lord Eldon refused to grant
the poet Shelley custody of his children because of his atheistic beliefs.
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right to choose the decision-maker and should not be compelled to ac-
cept an individual or committee chosen by the state whose values may
significantly differ from their own. The only limitation on this parental
right should be that imposed upon all parents, namely, that their con-
duct not constitute neglect.2"
Further, resolution of domestic disputes should be accomplished
privately. Insu-ring privacy helps quell feelings of embarassment and
inadequacy on the part of parents and reduces the negative impact of
familial disputes upon children. As used here, the concept of privacy
goes beyond merely closing the courtroom doors to the public. It
means not having one's domestic problems made a matter of public
record and not having one's future depend upon governmental fiat.29
Perhaps most important, it assumes removal of the dispute from a forum
traditionally associated with an adversary proceeding, thus avoiding the
inference that there is a winner and a loser, that one partner has been
"right" and one has been "wrong."
Finally, dispute resolution should be accomplished quickly. The
value preference for speed is particularly important from the child's
point of view. For him, uncertainty and delay can be the most difficult
aspect of the entire divorce process.30 Concern for his welfare
demands that decisions be made as rapidly as possible, consistent with
reasoned judgment. Unfortunately, rapid decision-making is not a
common attribute of modern overworked judicial systems, with their
elaborate procedural machinery and opportunities for multiple appel-
late reviews. Those same time-consuming procedures which have
come to be viewed as essential to the protection of litigants' rights may
work to deprive an affected child of the stability which is his most basic
need.
The failure of the judicial system to satisfy these basic value
preferences would seem to demand that an alternative vehicle for
domestic dispute resolution be made available. The most obvious sub-
stitute, arbitration, is already in limited use. As will be discussed
below, however, this form of dispute resolution has been less than en-
28. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
29. See note 79 infra and accompanying text.
30. See J. GoLDsTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNrr, BEYoND THE BEsr INTEREsrs oF
THE CHILD 42 (1973):
The child's-sense-of-time guideline would require decisionmakers to act with
"all deliberate speed"' to maximize each child's opportunity either to restore
stability to an existing relationship or to facilitate the establishment of new
relationships to "replace" old ones. Procedural and substantive decisions should




thusiastically received by the courts, and it also suffers from disabilities
which prevent adequate satisfaction of the above-mentioned value
preferences.
THE CURRENT ALTERNATIVE: ARBITRATION
Although there has been no broad survey of the extent to which
arbitration clauses have been utilized,3 there is some indirect evidence
that such clauses are far from unusual in separation agreements.12
Nevertheless, the arbitrability of certain critical matters facing divorced
parents is as yet unsettled.'3 In order to understand better the judicial
31. There were thirty-nine domestic relations arbitrations at the New York Regional
Office of the American Arbitration Association during 1973 and 1974. 1973-74 Survey,
supra note 12. Of the thirty-nine cases, twenty-four involved children, while the other
fifteen involved questions of wife support, property settlements and the like. Of the
twenty-four cases involving children, two were withdrawn, four were settled (one after
hearing), two resulted in consent awards (after hearing), one was stayed by a court
order, and one was held in abeyance by agreement of the parties pending the outcome
of a court proceeding brought by the claimant in the arbitration for joint custody. Of
the fifteen cases not involving children, two were withdrawn (one after hearing), one
was settled (after hearing) and one was discontinued with prejudice by stipulation (after
a two-day hearing). As has been noted, see note 12 supra, twenty-one of the twenty-
four child-related cases concerned child support. The other three cases, none of which
resulted in an arbitral award, involved difficulties typical of those plaguing the arbitra-
tion of child custody disputes. In one case, the agreement provided for joint custody
with the child in boarding school. The claimant-mother sought to have the child reside
at home. The father answered by pointing out that the arbitration clause was limited
to the selection of a private boarding school and that the case involved custody and
schooling which could only be determined by the state supreme court. The matter was
withdrawn. In another case, the court stayed arbitration on the ground that there was no
agreement to arbitrate the claims (although the agreement contained a broad arbitration
clause) where the husband claimed the wife had violated the agreement by failing to
consult on the children's education, by moving to a distant city and by failing to inform
him of the children's health. The husband was seeking the return of payments made
under protest for expenses incurred for the children's education without his consultation,
the establishment of an escrow fund for the children's education to be expended after
consultation, an accounting by the wife, and disclosure of information respecting the
health, welfare and education of the children. In the third case, the parties agreed
to hold the arbitration, initiated by the father, in abeyance pending the outcome of
a related matter in the supreme court. Here the parents were disputing the meaning
of the term "reasonable" under a clause permitting the father visitation "at reasonable
times" and "with reasonable frequency." See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
The father had also applied to the supreme court for, inter alia, joint custody and
an order directing the wife to comply with visitation requirements.
32. The major form book in the area generally favors arbitration as a means of
resolving both anticipated and unanticipated disputes arising under separation agree-
ments and provides a variety of examples of such clauses. Indeed, the author points
out that the inclusion of an arbitration clause encourages the parties to settle their dis-
putes themselves, thereby providing a positive psychological bonus. 1 A. LIND-EY, supra
note 8, § 29, at 29-3.
33. See notes 55-73 infra and accompanying text.
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reluctance to endorse the arbitration of post-marital disputes, a brief
description of the arbitration process is necessary. Since the American
Arbitration Association34 is the most active arbitration agency in the
country and has frequently undertaken the resolution of domestic rela-
tions matters, its procedure will be used as a model.
The Arbitration Process
Arbitration is a voluntary consensual process, one which is
premised on the idea that the arbitrator derives his authority from the
agreement and may not exceed the scope of that authority. 35 The par-
ties, therefore, can limit arbitration to disputes arising only under
certain terms of the agreement.3" In addition, the arbitrator must
decide the issue in the context of the agreement from which he derives
his authority, and not on the basis of extra-contractual considerations.
For example, in deciding the issue of whether a father is obligated to
pay for psychiatric care under a clause obligating him to pay medical
expenses, the arbitrator might properly consider the agreement itself,
what the parties contemplated when they entered into the agreement,
and what parties usually mean when they use this kind of language.
It would be incorrect for the arbitrator to conclude that, regardless of
what the parties had agreed, this child needed psychiatric care, that the
34. The American Arbitration Association is a non-profit independent agency
which administers arbitrations throughout the United States. It is undoubtedly the most
important agency of its kind. It maintains panels of arbitrators qualified to hear labor
and commercial disputes as well as disputes arising under separation agreements.
35. An arbitral award may be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded
his authority. See, e.g., Local 1078, UAW v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 149 Conn.
687, 183 A.2d 623 (1962); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7511(b) (iii) (McKinney 1963).
36. The process cannot get underway without an initial agreement to submit a par-
ticular dispute to arbitration. Doughboy Industries v. Pantasote Co., 17 App. Div. 2d
216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962) (labor case). Where there is disagreement as to whether
a particular issue is arbitrable, the question is normally resolved by a court. Uddo
v. Toarmina, 21 App. Div. 2d 402, 405, 250 N.Y.S.2d 645, 647 (1964) (stating the
"axiomatic proposition" that "one can only be compelled to arbitrate when one has
agreed to do so," but that "whether one has so agreed is a question for the court").
But cf. Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 9 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353
(1961) (court is precluded from declaring an agreement unenforceable where parties
have provided for arbitration of all disputes arising under the agreement).
In order to avoid such problems, the American Arbitration Association recom-
mends that the following "broad clause" be included in separation agreements.
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or
the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules
of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award
rendered by the Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction
thereof. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES
2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as AAA RULES].
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father was in a better position to pay for it than the mother, and that
he should therefore do so.
Once an arbitrable dispute has arisen, one spouse may invoke
arbitration by serving the other with a demand for arbitration. The
demand is not a formal document; it must, however, state the names
of the parties, the nature of the dispute, the relief sought, and the
authorizing arbitration clause. 7 If the parties have provided for
arbitration "pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Associa-
tion," the demand must be filed with the Association. 8
The parties may select their own arbitrators 9 or, where no agree-
ment is possible, request a court to appoint one.40  The AAA selection
process is designed to minimize the possibility of disagreement. On
receipt of a demand for arbitration, the AAA sends each party a list
of possible arbitrators drawn from its domestic relations panel,41 along
with an abbreviated description of each arbitrator's background. 42
Each party then excises the names of those individuals deemed un-
37. M. DOME, THE LAW AND PRACnCE OF COMMERCIAL ARBIrrATON § 14.01
(Supp. 1975); see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7503(c) (McKinney 1963); AAA RULES
§7.
38. AAA RULES § 7.
39. The agreement may call for a single arbitrator or a three-member panel. In
the latter case, the agreement may require each party to name an arbitrator with the
two party-appointed arbitrators naming the third, or it may provide for three neutral
arbitrators. See 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 8, § 29, at 29-1 to 29-2.
40. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1281.6 (West 1972); N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW
§ 7504 (McKinney 1963).
41. The AAA maintains a list of arbitrators who have some degree of expertise
in the domestic relations field. These arbitrators serve without compensation, although
in cases running over two days of hearing the AAA requests the parties to agree to
pay a nominal fee. Placement on the panel of arbitrators is apparently thought of as
desirable, and there is no dearth of persons wishing to serve. Most of the panelists
are lawyers. Although members of other disciplines, such as ministers, psychologists,
and social workers are represented in limited numbers, the AAA has evidently not made
a concerted effort to enlist such persons, perhaps as a result of the relatively low utili-
zation of arbitration in this area.
Until 1975, it was the practice in the New York Region to list only lawyer arbi-
trators unless another discipline was requested. It is the current practice to include
on the list one or possibly two representatives from other disciplines, perhaps a social
worker if visitation rights are involved or an accountant if financial matters are the
issue. In the approximately ten domestic relations cases initiated in New York since
this practice was invoked, a non-lawyer has been chosen only once. Conversation with
Ellen Malta-Brown, Supervisor of the Commercial Tribunal, N.Y. Region, American Ar-
bitration Association.
42. For example, the list may appear as follows:
John Jones, Esq.-Familiar with corp. law and matrimonial law
Ted Smith, Esq.-Matrimonial law
Tom Brown, Esq.-Corporate law, matrimonial, Brown & Doe, Esqs.
1973-74 Survey, supra note 12.
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satisfactory and numbers the others in order of preference. The
arbitrator with the lowest combined number is the one selected.43
Meaningful information about a proposed arbitrator who is un-
known to the parties is not presently available to them as a matter of
course. In this respect, there is a significant distinction between
domestic relations arbitration and labor arbitration. In the latter field,
arbitrators are seasoned, paid professionals who have developed reputa-
tions as to their judiciousness, impartiality, competence, and knowledge
of the field.44  The parties to a domestic relations arbitration, by con-
trast, can rely only upon the individual's legal competence and his
general reputation in the community.45
Presumably, if the biographical information supplied is too sketchy, a party or his
lawyer could try to make further inquiries as to the individual's qualifications, predilec-
tions, values, etc. from other lawyers or from the AAA.
In one case in the 1973-74 Survey, supra note 12, one party did so and a list con-
taining more detailed biographical data, including the arbitrator's educational back-
ground, was sent out. If requested to do so the AAA will send a copy of the proposed
arbitrator's panel card. This card gives his educational background, present and former
positions, professional associations and qualifications (e.g., the percentage of time spent
in the domestic relations area). No one has ever requested or been given information
of a more personal nature regarding the arbitrator's values or religious or other beliefs.
43. AAA RULEs § 12. If no arbitrator is found to be acceptable by both parties,
a second list may be submitted. The parties may, at this point, express their require-
ments more specifically. For example, in one case in the 1973-74 Survey, supra note
12, the first list was completely rejected by one side as containing "unknowns" or law-
yers whose biographies showed "some" marital law experience. The second list con-
tained the names of well-known members of the marital bar. If the parties are unable
to agree, the AAA will appoint an arbitrator pursuant to its authority under AAA RuLEs
§ 12.
44. Information about a labor arbitrator's education, experience, general reputation,
and competence can generally be obtained from the appointing agency and from lawyers,
business executives, and union officers. In addition, business associations such as the
Chamber of Commerce often compile information about arbitration involving a member
firm. Finally, the Bureau of National Affairs and Prentice-Hall, Inc. publish biographi-
cal sketches of the arbitrators in reported cases and index these cases by arbitrator.
M. TROTrA, LABOR ARurrA . or 77-78 (1961).
45. Of course, the AAA will monitor the arbitrator's activities to some extent and
may remove those who prove inadequate from a panel. In addition, the selected arbi-
trator is obligated to disclose any information which could reflect on his impartiality.
AAA RuLx-s § 19; Milliken Woolens, Inc. v. Weber Knit Sportswear, Inc., 11 App.
Div. 2d 166, 169-70, 202 N.Y.S.2d 431, 434-35 (1960) (arbitrator's association with
the same law firm as the trial counsel to one of the parties to the dispute, without
disclosure to the other party, caused arbitrator's disqualification. Another arbitrator was
disqualified because of his failure to disclose the fact that he had bought textiles for
his employer from a company that was a party to the dispute); see Commonwealth Coat-
ings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (nondisclosure of a business
connection between one of three arbitrators and one of the parties to the dispute consti-
tutes grounds for vacation of arbitrators' award, under § 10 of the United States Arbi-
tration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1970)). In the 1973-74 Survey, disclosure of rather remote
Vol. 1976:911"1
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The goal of the AAA is to encourage final resolution of a dispute
within three months. To this end, the parties are required to select
their arbitrator quickly46 and to schedule a hearing within two months
of the initial demand.47 The arbitrator is empowered to fix the time
of the hearing if necessary and, where appropriate, to permit postpone-
ments.48 At the hearing, the arbitrator is not bound by the rules of
evidence. Rather, he is instructed to sift out evidence which is proba-
tive and reliable and to give it appropriate weight.49  The AAA has,
however, imposed certain rules designed to protect the integrity of the
arbitral process. For example, the arbitrator may not examine wit-
nesses in camera" nor consult outside specialists without the consent
of the parties.5' He does have the authority to request and, in most
states, to subpoena additional evidence.52  In keeping with the AAA's
emphasis on expediting the resolution of disputes, the arbitrator is
required to make his award within thirty days of the hearing. 58
associations with the law firm of one of the parties resulted, in two cases, in a request
for disqualification by the other party.
46. The parties must return the list of possible arbitrators, stating their preferences,
within seven days after receiving the list from the AAA. This period may be extended
in the event of extenuating circumstances. AAA RULES § 12. The 1973-74 Survey
indicates that such extensions, of short duration, are not infrequent.
47. Should one party not appear at a scheduled hearing after having been served
with proper notice, the arbitrator can proceed ex parte where there is no local law to
the contrary. AAA RULES § 29; see N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7506(b) (McKinney
1963). See also M. DomKE, supra note 37, § 18.04; cf. UNIFORM ARBrrRATION ACT
§ 5(a) (1955).
48. AAA RULES § 20, 25. See also N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7506(b) (McKinney
1963). The arbitrator can use his control over the time and place of a hearing to
prevent undue delay and to avoid an unfair disadvantage to one party. For example,
in one 1973 case, the father had obtained two postponements of a hearing because he
was working on a project in another town. His third request for a continuance was
also granted, but only after the arbitrator set a firm date for the hearing. In another
1973 case, one spouse requested a Saturday hearing because he had recently been on
jury duty and was reluctant to miss another workday. In spite of the other spouse's
objection, the arbitrator granted the request in the interest of fairness. 1973-74 Survey,
supra note 12.
49. AAA RULES § 30; see M. DoMRm, supra note 37, § 24.02.
50. "All evidence shall be taken in the presence ... of all the parties." AAA
RULES § 30. See generally M. DOMKE, supra note 37, § 24.02, at 237. This
rule denies the arbitrator the opportunity to probe in private the child's true feelings
and desires-something which a family court judge is permitted to do in certain states.
See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
51. Even if consent is given, the arbitrator retains responsibility for the ultimate
award, giving such studies only the weight he deems appropriate. See M. DOMKE, supra
note 37, § 24.05, at 248-49. See generally AAA RULES § 30 (1973); N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
LAw § 7505 (McKinney 1963).
52. See M. DomKE, supra note 37, § 24.03; AAA RULES § 30.
53. AAA RULES § 40. Of the arbitrations which went to final award in the 1973-
74 Survey, supra note 12, eight were completed in three to four months. Another ten,
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Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards
Where both parties wish to proceed with the arbitration of their
dispute and are prepared to abide by the arbitrator's award, there is
no difficulty in utilizing this process. Problems arise when one party
objects and the other seeks judicial enforcement of the agreement to
arbitrate or of an award. Despite the prevalence of statutes which
appear to mandate such enforcement, 54 the courts have been reluctant
to relinquish their parens patriae responsibilities. In general, the courts
have simply refused to be bound by consensual arrangements regarding
child custody and related matters. 5
In New York there has been some judicial reconsideration of
this attitude. An examination of the case law development in that
state is instructive. Though there appears to have been early judicial
hostility to arbitration of any domestic relations matter,56 the New York
Court of Appeals has recognized for some time that spousal support
however, took five to six months, eight required eight to nine months and one, a prop-
erty settlement arising out of a stipulation in a divorce, took eleven months.
An arbitration lasting more than three months may sometimes be justifiable. Occa-
sionally the case requires more than one hearing date or the parties wish to submit
briefs. Often, however, there are postponements. Indeed, the study indicated that
awards follow quickly upon the completion of hearings, and the clear inference is that
delay in completing the process results primarily from delay occurring before the hear-
ing.
54. Over 30 states now have modem arbitration statutes. See M. DOMKE, supra
note 37, § 4.01 & n.1. See also U.S. Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (1970). Under
such statutes, arbitral awards may. be vacated only on very limited grounds. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Civ. PAc. LAw § 7511 (McKinney 1963) ((1) corruption, fraud or misconduct;
(2) partiality of the arbitrator; (3) arbitrator exceeded his power; (4) procedural de-
fects).
55. See, e.g., Wertlake v. Wertlake, 127 N.J. Super. 595, 599, 318 A.2d 446, 448
(Ch. 1974) ("Since the State is parens patriae to children, and since the support, edu-
cation and welfare of children is the exclusive concern of the courts so that parties
can make no permanent binding contract with respect to those matters, child support
is not arbitrable"). Although no other state (except New York) has considered the
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate a dispute involving child custody, the
proposition that a court will not cede parens patriae jurisdiction notwithstanding an
agreement of the parties is generally accepted. See, e.g., Emrich v. McNeil, 126
F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 69 Idaho 341, 346, 206
P.2d 523, 526 (1949); Gafford v. Phelps, 235 N.C. 218, 222, 69 S.E.2d 313, 316 (1952);
Bastian v. Bastian, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 408, 410, 160 N.E.2d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 1959);
Buchanan v. Buchanan, 170 Va. 458, 477, 197 S.E. 426, 434 (1938). See note 3 supra.
In the few other reported decisions outside New York, the arbitration of matters relating
to the welfare of children seems to have been either approved or accepted without ques-
tion. See duPont v. duPont, 40 Del. Ch. 290, 181 A.2d 95 (1962); Eaton v. Bums,
31 Ind. 390 (1869); Masterson v. Masterson, 22 Ky. L. Rptr. 1193, 60 S.W. 301 (Ct.
App. 1901); Kutz v. Kutz, 341 N.E.2d 682 (Mass. 1976).
56. See, e.g., Application of Stem, 285 N.Y. 239, 33 N.E.2d 689 (1941) (amount
of support a husband should pay to his wife not arbitrable).
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is a proper subject for arbitration.57  Until 1960, however, the courts
had clearly rejected the arbitration of matters pertaining to the children
of the divorced couple. In Hill v. Hill,58 for example, the Supreme
Court denied a wife's motion to compel arbitration of custody pursuant
to a separation agreement. Similarly, in Michelman v. Michelman,5 9
the court refused to enforce a separation agreement provision requiring
arbitration of visitation disputes, stating that: "The well-being of this
child as it will or may be affected by visitation rights can only be
determined on a [judicial] hearing."60
The first retreat from this absolute judicial position appeared in
Freidberg v. Freidberg,61 in which the court compelled arbitration of
a dispute concerning the education of the parties' son. The court dis-
tinguished this case from Michelman on the grounds that here only
selection of a school and the payment of tuition, not custody or visita-
tion, were involved. 62  Despite the purported distinction, Freidberg
represented a clear departure from the traditionally rigid view of the
non-arbitrability of matters concerning children.68
In 1964, the Appellate Division (First Department) utilized a less
than ideal factual situation as a vehicle for suggesting that all post-
separation disputes, including those involving child custody, should be
viewed as arbitrable. In Sheets v. Sheets,64 the parties had entered
into a separation agreement which was subsequently incorporated into
a Florida divorce decree. The agreement granted custody of the chil-
dren to the wife, subject to the husband's rights to visit the children
and to be consulted on matters relating to their health, welfare and edu-
cation. Disputes arising under these provisions were to be "settled by
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association. 6 Pursuant to this provision, the husband served the wife
with a demand for arbitration, alleging violations of his visitation rights,
57. See, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 296 N.Y. 778, 71 N.E.2d 214 (1947) (mem.)
(affirming order directing husband to arbitrate amount of support for both wife and
child); Luttinger v. Luttinger, 294 N.Y. 855, 62 N.E.2d 487 (mem.), affg 268 App.
Div. 1025, 52 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1945) (mem.). See also Lasek v. Lasek, 13 App. Div.
2d 242, 215 N.Y.S.2d 983 (1961) (granting stay of wife's action for breach of separa-
tion agreement pending arbitration); Zuckerman v. Zuckerman, 96 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup.
Ct. 1950) (upholding validity of an arbitration provision in a separation agreement).
58. 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
59. 5 Misc. 2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
60. Id., 135 N.Y.S.2d at 609.
61. 23 Misc. 2d 196, 201 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
62. Id. at 197, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 607.
63. See Note, supra note 3, at 730.
64. 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1964).
65. Id. at 177, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
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failure to provide adequately for the children's education, and aliena-
tion of the children's affection. The demand sought punitive damages
for these claimed violations of the agreement, such damages to be set off
against the husband's obligation to pay alimony. The Appellate
Division affirmed the trial court's order staying arbitration on the
ground that the separation agreement could not "reasonably be con-
strued as obligating either party to submit to arbitration the matter of
assessment of punitive damages for a violation of any of [its] provi-
sions." 6 Preliminary to announcing its narrow disposition of the case,
however, the court, in extended dicta, discussed generally the arbitra-
bility of disputes concerning the beneficial interests of the children of
a broken marriage. Rejecting the holdings of Hill and Michelman, the
court declared that "there seems to be no clear and valid reason why
the arbitration process should not be made available in the area of cus-
tody and the incidents thereto, i.e., choice of schools, summer camps,
medical and surgical expenses, trips and vacations. 8 7
In contrast to its stand in favor of the general practice of arbitra-
tion of child-related disputes, however, the Sheets court expressly
reserved the right to review arbitration awards. The court emphasized
that the use of arbitration would not undermine "the inherent power
of the courts to safeguard the welfare of children," since any award
could be challenged by an interested party6" on the ground that it con-
flicted with the best interests of the child.69 If such a conflict were
66. Id. at 180, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
67. Id. at 177, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
68. mhe provisions of any [arbitration] award could be challenged in court
. at the instance of a parent, a grandparent, an interested relative, or the
child himself by a friend . .. . The challenge might take the form of opposi-
tion to confirmation of the award, of a cross-application invoking the court's
paternal jurisdiction, or an independent summary proceeding.
Once the Court's paternal jurisdiction is invoked, it would examine into
the matter, de novo . . . . Id. at 178, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 323-24 (emphasis
added).
69. The court added, however, that there is a difference between an arbitral award
which merely affects a child's interests and one which adversely affects his interests:
However, the award could not be effectively attacked by a dissatisfied
parent merely because it affected the child. Obviously every such award will
have that effect. What must be shown to evoke judicial intervention is that
the award adversely affects the welfare and best interest of the child-clearly
a much narrower issue. Thus, for example, an award might provide (1) that
a father have visitation rights on one particular day of the week instead of
another day; (2) that the child wear clothes purchased from some high-priced
tailoring establishment rather than another in a lower-price range; (3) that
the child should be accompanied to school by a parent or governess; (4) that
the child should have no, or a particular, religious training; or (5) that the
child go to a summer camp in the mountains rather than one located at sea
level. For our purpose, these examples, which could be multiplied indef-
initely, will suffice to clarify the distinction sought to be drawn.
All of the above situations present determinations which affect the child;
yet the only one which could be deemed to have an adverse effect is the one
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found, the "courts would treat [the award] as a nullity insofar as the
child is concerned, irrespective of what binding effect it may have on
the parents."70
Subsequently, the New York Court of Appeals apparently ap-
proved the Sheets approach, citing its "thorough and convincing
opinion" in upholding an arbitrator's award of child support.71 Never-
theless, the arbitrability in New York of non-financial matters pertain-
ing to the child remains unsettled. In the later case of Agur v. Agur,7 2
for example, the Appellate Division (Second Department) refused to
compel arbitration of a custody dispute. Its actual holding was predi-
cated upon the narrow ground that the separation agreement had
improperly restricted the arbitrators' consideration to only one relevant
factor-the effect of Jewish religious law-and restricted the choice of
arbitrators to those versed in such law. But the court expressed severe
reservations about the workability of the system of arbitration followed
by judicial review which had been endorsed in Sheets:
We harbor grave doubt whether such a two-stage procedure could
have wide application. Of necessity, the second stage of the suggested
course of action takes precedence over the first-to such an extent
that duplication of time, expense and effort seems inevitable. Nor
does it seem advantageous to the best interests of the child that the
question of custody be postponed while a rehearsal of the decisive
inquiry is held.73
This disagreement among the New York courts7 4 is of course only
reflective of the general uncertainty as to the most efficient method of
dealing with religious training. It might be that the provision regarding the
proper camp to attend would also fall into the category of adverse effects if it
were shown that a summer camp at a high altitude would be inimical to the
child's health. An arbitration award which purported to adjudicate the latter
two items could successfully be attacked in court, as hereinabove indicated,
by opposition to a motion to confirm the award or by an independent proceed-
ing. However, as to the other examples, a court could confirm the award
upon the theory that while they affected the child they could not reasonably
be deemed to have any substantial effect on the child's best interest and wel-
fare. Id. at 179, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 324-25.
70. Id. at 178, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
71. Schneider v. Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 126, 216 N.E.2d 318, 319, 269 N.Y.S.2d
107, 109 (1966); cf. Goldenberg v. Goldenberg, 19 N.Y.2d 759, 226 N.E.2d 185, 279
N.Y.S.2d 359 (1967) (mem.); Sperling v. Sperling, 26 App. Div. 2d 827, 274 N.Y.S.2d
107 (1966) (mem.).
72. 32 App. Div. 2d 16, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1969), appeal dismissed mem., 27 N.Y.
2d 643, 261 N.E.2d 903, 313 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1970), motion for stay denied, 29 N.Y.2d
649 (1971) (table), appeal dismissed mem., 32 N.Y.2d 703, 296 N.E.2d 458, 343 N.Y.S.
2d 607, motion to vacate order dismissing appeal denied mem., 33 N.Y.2d 643, 301
N.E.2d 555, 347 N.Y.S.2d 588 (1973).
73. 32 App. Div. 2d at 21, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 778 (footnote omitted).
74. The departments of the Appellate Division which decided Sheets and Agur have
reaffirmed their respective positions, See Kleiner v. Sanjenis, 46 App. Div. 2d 617,
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promoting the welfare of the child. The intuitive hesitation of the
courts to endorse completely the arbitration of disputes affecting chil-
dren can be traced to the notion that the arbitrator's authority is
delimited by the parents' agreement.75 His decision, therefore, should
reflect his interpretatidn of what the parties intended rather than his
perception of the child's "best interests."
The arbitration process also has significant drawbacks from the
parents' point of view. In particular, it falls short of satisfying the value
preferences discussed earlier.7 6 As will be recalled, the preference for
family autonomy requires that the parents be able to choose a decision-
-maker whose values will most nearly parallel their own, so that the deci-
sion made will represent, to the extent possible, the one which the
parents would have made had they still been a family unit. The basic
machinery for such a choice exists; however, the lack of readily avail-
able information about the arbitrator deprives the parents of the oppor-
tunity to make an educated choice of their surrogate. 77  In addition,
even assuming a proper choice could be made, the arbitrator cannot
presently act as a parent surrogate since he lacks the ability to consider
the interests of the child from the parents' point of view and to alter
the arrangements in the original agreement where circumstances have
changed. 78
Arbitration as presently practiced does fulfill the value preference
for privacy. The sessions themselves are carried on in an atmosphere
of complete privacy and are supervised by an individual in whose dis-
cretion the parties will have impliedly expressed confidence. Public
access to arbitration records is also limited.79  With respect to speed,
359 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1974) (mem.) (1st Dep't [Sheets]; provision in separation agree-
ment that controversies arising between parties be submitted to Supreme Court for deci-
sions pursuant to Simplified Procedure for Court Determination of Disputes is valid
and enforceable); Storch v. Storch, 38 App. Div. 2d 904, 329 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1st Dep't
1972) (mem.); Nestel v. Nestel, 38 App. Div. 2d 942, 943, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243
(1972) (mem.) (2d Dep't [Agur]; arbitration award with respect to custody vacated
because of in camera questioning of children by arbitrators. "In our judgment, this
case is illustrative of the inappropriateness in general of agreements to arbitrate custody
of minor children").
The conflict between these courts appears to be causing some confusion in lower
New York courts. See, e.g., Fence v. Fence, 64 Misc. 2d 480, 314 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Fam-
ily Ct. 1970).
75. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
76. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
78. See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
79. See note 12 supra. In addition, no transcript will be made of an arbitration
hearing unless requested by one of the parties. AAA RULEs § 22.
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however, this virtue of the arbitration process itself is undermined by
the present state of the law affording a parent, unhappy with the award,
a chance to relitigate certain or all matters decided by the arbitrator.
Arbitration, therefore, is sufficiently problematic to render it
unattractive to many drafters of separation agredments and perhaps
unworthy of zealous promotion before the courts. This should not,
however, preclude the search for a workable mechanism which incor-
porates those values important to the parties. Moreover, the Sheets °
line of cases in New York suggests that the courts may be receptive
to a modified version of the arbitration process, particularly if elabor-
ated in definite procedural form and articulated in terms of specific
public policy goals to be achieved. The discussion which follows sets
forth the authors' conception of such a mechanism.
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE: MEDIATION-ARBITRATION
Phase One: Drafting the Separation Agreement
Since this is the document which will largely direct the post-
divorce relationship of the parents and their children, the care with
which the separation agreement must be drafted cannot be overempha-
sized.81 Inasmuch as the document will govern extremely close inter-
personal relationships, and not simply financial-legal ones, counsel
should urge their clients to seek the assistance of a family counseling or
mental health professional in the negotiation of the agreement. Such a
professional would be neither an advocate for either of the parties nor a
decision-maker. His function would be to open lines of communication
within the family and to assist the parents in making mutually acceptable
decisions which are rational and sensitive to the developmental needs of
their children. 2 He can help family members establish new relationship
80. See notes 64-71 supra and accompanying text.
81. One commentator has observed that most separation agreements are "mundane
economic documents." Kohut, Therapeutic Separation Agreements, 51 A.B.A.J. 756,
757 (1965).
82. The essential function of the consultant is mediation, with the added element
of responsibility for focusing the parents on the best interests of the child-the purpose,
therefore, is clearly not the mere promotion of an agreement. We use the term "consult-
ant" to distinguish the process chronologically from the mediation of subsequent dis-
putes. The parties might consult the professional even where they can reach agreement
without mediation to insure the merit of their agreement from the children's point of
view.
While the consultant may be anyone with special counseling skills who is mutually
acceptable to the parties, it would be preferable to have the process conducted under
the auspices of a non-profit organization such as the American Arbitration Association,
since it would simplify the mechanics of the subsequent mediation-arbitration procedures
discussed below. See notes 84-99 infra and accompanying text.
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patterns appropriate to their new life situations and advise them in
identifying and realistically addressing long-term and contingency plan-
ning needs. It must be stressed, however, that the object of the consul-
tation is to enable the parents to reach their own decisions and not to
have the consultant impose his notions of the "best interests" of the
children.
The lawyer's role at this stage is twofold. First, he will want to
assure that his client's legal rights will be protected and that agreements
reached in consultation will not have unforeseen legal ramifications.
The lawyer should, however, cooperate with the consultant and not intro-
duce unnecessary adversary elements into the process. Second, he
must draft a separation agreement which clearly and precisely ex-
presses the parties' decision on such matters as custody, visitation, sup-
port, and training so as to minimize the possibility of later disagree-
ment. Problems unnoticed in the consultation stage may surface when
the detailed work of drafting gets underway. If so, further resort to
consultation may be called for.
In addition to the elaboration of particular items such as the
amount of child support and the periods of visitation, it would be advis-
able to insert a more general statement of the parents' goals and objec-
tives with respect to their children. Such a statement would insure that
future decisions as to the children's welfare will be made in the context
of the values deemed important by the parents. Finally, the separation
agreement should provide for the resolution of future disputes by the
use of the mediation-arbitration procedures discussed below. a
Phase Two: Resolving Disputes Arising Under the Separation Agreement
Even if consultation has resulted in a satisfactory separation
agreement, child-related disputes may arise subsequently as to the
application or interpretation of the agreement. This may reflect the
fact that certain problems were unanticipated at the time of drafting
or that the particular resolution of problems which had been anticipated
in a general sense was thought to be best deferred until a later date.
A substantial change in the circumstances of one or both of the parties
may also require modification of the agreement.
For a discussion of the utilization of counseling techniques and the training of
"marital mediators" see Woodhead, The Mediated Divorce: A New Way of Parting,
Atlanta Journal and Constitution, Nov. 23, 1975, Magazine, at 12.
83. This may be accomplished by describing the procedures in the agreement itself




Mediation. Since the basic adjustment of differences between
parents on matters relating to their children will have been achieved
with the help of consultation, it is reasonable to rely on a basically
similar method to resolve these subsequent disputes.8 4 In order to dis-
tinguish this phase of dispute settlement from the consultation discussed
earlier, we shall call it mediation.
The practice of mediation developed in the labor relations field
as a preferred alternative to arbitration and legal action. Unlike these
more coercive forms of dispute resolution, the objective of mediation
is to get the parties to compromise their positions and thereby to reach
a voluntary agreement between themselves."5 The process is premised
on the notion that the presence of a disinterested third person,
familiar with the issues involved in the dispute and skilled in promoting
communication, will enable the parties to overcome their antagonism
and to recognize their common interest in self-determination of the par-
ticular issue. As Professor Lon Fuller has stated, the "central quality
of mediation" is
its capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing
rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared per-
ception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their atti-
tudes and dispositions toward one another.86
In a post-marital dispute, 7 therefore, the function of the mediator
would be to mollify the interchange between the parents and to make
them aware that, if the matter is settled "within the family," the deci-
sion will reflect their common values. In addition, because of his
expertise, the mediator will be able to focus the attention of the parties
on the interests of the child. This latter role does not represent an
attempt to impose an external paternalistic force; rather, it reflects the
assumption that the parents will want to reach a decision which will pro-
84. Even if consultation was not utilized in the original negotiation, the assistance
of skilled mental health or family counseling professionals in helping the parents re-
solve their dispute at this stage is advisable.
85. See generally King, Arbitration of Automobile Accident Claims, 14 U. FLA.
L. REv. 328, 333 (1963).
86. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 305, 325
(1971).
87. Professor Fuller went on to identify several characteristics of the labor-manage-
ment relationship which make mediation a particularly appropriate mechanism in that
context. Three of these traits are also found in post-marital problems: (1) a dyadic
relationship in which (2) the parties must reach an agreement in order to preserve their
control over their common actions and in which (3) the agreement reached by the par-
ties will help to define their future interactions. Id. at 311. See also Marschall &
Gatz, The Custody Decision Process: Toward New Roles for Parents and the State,
7 N.C.C.U.L.J. 50, 63 (1975).
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mote the child's welfare. It must be recognized, however, that parents
functioning in the emotionally charged atmosphere of a marital dispute
may need assistance in distinguishing the child's best interests from
their own natural possessory interest in the child.
The procedure to be used will largely be determined by the
individual mediators. 8   In general, most mediators employ a combina-
tion of joint conferences and separate consultation, each step being
designed to elicit certain information. For example, the mediator
might initially schedule a joint conference in order to identify the ele-
ments and scope of the disagreement. He would also be able to
observe and assess the relationship between the parties. Typically,
however, the antagonism between the parties will preclude any mean-
ingful conciliation, at least in the early meetings. 80 For this reason,
the mediator might then conduct a series of private meetings with the
individual parties. At these consultation sessions, he would try to
ascertain the points on which each party may be willing to compromise,
perhaps attempting to explain the position of the other side in a reason-
able manner. Such meetings also give the mediator a chance to
become acquainted with the disputants in a relaxed atmosphere.00
Finally, the mediator may return to joint conferences in order to pro-
pose alternative settlements.91
88. A unique and essential characteristic of the conciliation process is its flex-
ibility . . . . A conciliator cannot follow the same procedure in every case;
he must adjust his approaches, strategy and techniques to the circumstances of
each dispute. Probably for this reasor, it has sometimes been said that con-
ciliation is an art; the "conciliator is a solitary artist recognizing at most a
few guiding stars and depending mainly on his personal power of divination."
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CONCILIATION IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 4
(1973), quoting Meyer, Function of the Mediator in Collective Bargaining, 13
IND. & LABOR RELATIONS REV. 159 (1960).
The mediator enters the situation after the problem has arisen, and his effectiveness
will depend upon his ability to establish a relationship of trust and confidence with
the parties. It is suggested, therefore, that, where possible, the same mental health or
family counseling professional who consulted on the separation agreement conduct the
mediation.
89. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 88, at 48-49.
90. Id. at 49-50. See also Finnegan, Federal Mediation: How It Works, 9 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1959); Marschall & Gatz, supra note 87, at 64. It is the availability
of these informal, private discussions which most clearly distinguishes mediation from
arbitration.
The procedures appropriate for mediation are those most likely to uncover
that pattern of adjustment which will most nearly meet the interests of both
parties. The procedures appropriate for arbitration are those which most
securely guarantee each of the parties a meaningful chance to present argu-
ments and proofs for a decision in his favor. Thus, private consultations with
the parties, generally wholly improper on the part of the arbitrator, are an
indispensable tool of mediation. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitra-
tor, NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, PROCEEDINGS 8, 29 (1962) reprinted in 1
ELLIOTT, MATERIALS AND CASES ON ARBITRATION 3 (1968).
91. See Finnegan, supra note 90, at 10; Marschall & Gatz, supra note 87, at 64.
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If mediation proves successful in resolving the particular contro-
versy, primary responsibility for the child's welfare will have been left
in the hands of the parents. Moreover, because of the mediator's
expertise and concern, the decision will have been reached with the
best interests of the child kept in mind. The accommodations reached
as a result of mediation should be incorporated into an amendment to
the separation agreement. Future disputes will then be resolved in
terms of the separation agreement as so modified.
Obviously, not all disputes will in fact be settled through media-
tion. Resort to third-party decision-making may occasionally become
necessary. Even in these situations, however, the unsuccessful
mediation should have narrowed and more sharply defined the issues
to be resolved.
Arbitration. If mediation fails, the parties may proceed to
arbitration. Selection of an arbitrator is of crucial significance since the
object of this scheme is to come as close as possible to duplicating
parental decision-making. Skill as a consultant-mediator does not
qualify one as an arbitrator. 92 The mediator's object is to help the parties
communicate and to assist them in making their own decisions. The
arbitrator, on the other hand, substitutes his judgment for that of the
parents. It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that the parents
select an arbitrator in whom they have confidence, who they feel views
the needs and problems of their children from the same general per-
spective as themselves, whom, in short, they trust to make vital deci-
sions affecting the lives of their children if they cannot make those deci-
sions themselves. The selection may be accomplished in either of two
ways: (1) the separation agreement can name, or the parties can at
the time of arbitration jointly appoint, a particular friend, relation,
clergyman or other person who is willing to act as arbitrator, or (2)
the parties can agree to utilize the selection machinery provided by an
organization such as the American Arbitration Association.93 If this
92. In no event should the mediator ever serve as arbitrator, even if requested to do
so by the parties. The possibility that the mediator might later become the arbitrator
would tend to make the parties less open and candid during mediation. In addition, the
arbitrator must be impartial. His activities as mediator in the same dispute may easily
have an adverse effect on this necessary characteristic of the arbitration. For the same
reasons, a mediator should never be callable as a witness, expert or otherwise, during an
arbitration, nor should he submit a report of any kind to the arbitrator.
93. Whether it is best to name the persons who will arbitrate disputes or simply to
specify the means of selection of such arbitrators is a difficult question. There are
both advantages and disadvantages in naming a specific arbitrator in the agreement.
Doing so assures the availability of a decision-maker in whom both parents have per-
sonal confidence and who, presumably, largely shares the values of the parents. On
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second method is adopted it is essential that the biographical and back-
ground material on each potential arbitrator be sufficiently extensive
to enable the parties to make a meaningful choice. Moreover, the avail-
ability of arbitrators with experience in all disciplines should be made
known and the parties encouraged to specify, preferably before the pro-
posed lists are compiled, the type of arbitrator preferred. 94  Only in
this way can the parents reasonably be expected to make selections
which substantially conform to their own values and which produce
arbitrators who are representative parent surrogates.
One beneficial result of the increased use of arbitration in
domestic relations matters may be the creation of a group of trained
professionals who would be especially concerned with the integrity
of the process. 95 As in labor arbitration, these individuals will need
to be sensitive to the importance of preserving the ongoing relation-
ship between the parties."6 As time goes on, they will develop reputa-
tions for their judiciousness, integrity and competence which will aid
the parties in the selection process.
The separation agreement or the procedural rules incorporated by
reference therein should expressly confer certain extraordinary powers
on the arbitrator, such as the right to call in neutral expert witnesses
9 7
and to interview the children in camera if he deems fit.95  In addition,
the other hand, it may be difficult to persuade a friend or relation to assume arbitration
responsibilities. Moreover, relationships tend to change after a divorce; a choice which
appears wise at the time of entry into a separation agreement may be regretted later.
The naming of a particular arbitrator may also be unduly restrictive in light of the
range of disputes that can conceivably arise.
94. Such a stated preference would be honored by the AAA under current pro-
cedures. Conversation with Ellen Maltz-Brown, Supervisor of the Commercial Tribu-
nal, N.Y. Region, American Arbitration Association.
95. Paid arbitrators would also arguably be better able to resist the temptation to
rush the decision-making process. Moreover, compensation might attract into 'the field
mental health personnel who would not be able to afford time off for pro bono arbitra-
tion. On the other hand, the maintenance of lower costs is a valid argument for per-
petuating the present system of encouraging qualified persons to volunteer their time.
96. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
97. See note 25 supra.
98. By specifying this power in the separation agreement, the objection to in camera
interviews expressed in Nestel v. Nestel, 38 App. Div. 2d 942, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1972)
(mem.), see note 24 supra, should be obviated.
One of the most difficult questions in working out the mechanics of the arbitration
procedure is whether the child is entitled to representation by counsel and elevation
to full-party status. That the interests of the child are vitally affected by the process
is beyond dispute. Yet the fact that, in the situation of the intact family, the child
is normally without counsel in the parental decision-making process (a process which
also vitally affects him) leads the authors to conclude by analogy that he should prob-
ably be denied counsel in the arbitration proceeding. Neither should a guardian ad
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the arbitrator should be empowered to modify the agreement and fill
in its gaps. Parents of intact families are always free to change their
minds or adapt their child-rearing plans to new conditions. A similar
flexibility ought to be accorded to the parent surrogate embodied in
the arbitrator. This flexibility should not, however, become an excuse
for ignoring the express terms of an agreement which the parties have
labored so mightily to formulate. The arbitrator should be instructed
that the agreement represents conscious value choices by the parties
with respect to their children which should be upset only in response
to substantially changed circumstances. 99 In every case, the arbitrator
should be guided by the statement of the parents' objectives and values
contained in the separation agreement.
Enforcement of the Arbitral Award. The proposed mechanism
for the resolution of post-marital disputes has been designed to pre-
serve to the extent practicable the autonomy of the family. Only where
the parents are completely unable to resolve their differences, even with
the aid of a qualified consultant, is the authority to decide matters con-
cerning their child's welfare taken out of their hands. Even in these
instances, however, the decision-maker will be someone who shares the
parents' basic values. In addition, the mediation-arbitration procedure
is relatively private and can be accomplished with reasonable speed.
If, however, in those situations requiring arbitration, the award
made is subject to de novo review by the courts, 100 all of those attributes
will be diminished. 1 1 It is submitted, therefore, that an arbitral award
made pursuant to the procedures outlined herein should be treated by
the courts in the same fashion as an award made in commercial or labor
arbitration: the arbitrator's decision should be conclusive absent
litem be appointed, since that would be inconsistent with the premise that basic child-
rearing decisions are the primary responsibility of the parents or, as in arbitration, their
surrogate. This does not imply, however, that the arbitrator should not consider the
wishes of the child, as good parents presumably would when making important decisions
which affect him. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See generally Burt, Forcing
Protection on Children and Their Parents: The Impact of Wyman v. James, 69 MICH.
L. REv. 1259 (1971).
99. This, of course, is the same rule which governs judicial modification of custody
decrees. See Foster & Freed, Child Custody (pt. 2), 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 613, 622-26
(1964).
100. See, e.g., Sheets v. Sheets, 22 App. Div. 2d 176, 179, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320, 324
(1964) (discussed at notes 64-70 supra and accompanying text) (an arbitrator's award,
although entitled to substantial weight, will be vacated whenever it "adversely affects
the welfare and best interests of the child"). The Sheets standard of review, of course,
is preferable to the refusal of many jurisdictions even to consider an arbitral award
in child-related matters. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
101. See notes 26-30 supra and accompanying text.
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misconduct on his part or a breach of public policy. 102 In child-related
cases, public policy demands only that the award not constitute, or make
possible, the neglect of the child. Application of only the current min-
imal neglect standard, 03 which must be met by all parents, divorced or
not, would prevent the interference with family autonomy which under
the present system is predicated solely on the breakdown of the marital
relationship.
Unless the courts are willing to refrain from interfering in the
model of dispute resolution proposed in this Article, the value of that
model may be largely negated; parents will know that if they "lose"
in arbitration they can still resort to the courts.1 °4  There are also
reasons not directly related to the model for the courts to relinquish
their parental role. In the first place, the state's prerogative to care
for minors as parens patriae developed at a time when those seeking
divorces were considered "'sick' persons, misfits, [or] hopeless neu-
rotics. . . -105 A diluted version of this attitude was reflected in this
country by the enactment of statutes which permitted divorce only as
a form of punishment for marital misconduct.'0 6 The modem trend,
however, as evidenced by the proliferation of no-fault divorce laws, L T
is toward a recognition that most domestic difficulties are not the
product of one spouse's "sickness" or wrongdoing and that state inter-
ference in such matters should be minimal. 0 8 In support of this posi-
102. See note 54 supra; see also M. DomKE, supra note 37, at 312-13; UNIFORM
ARB RATION AcT § 12(a) (1955).
103. See note 17 supra.
104. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
The courts' initially passive role in the adversary system gives rise to an interesting
contradiction. Courts participate in the resolution of post-marital disputes only when
their jurisdiction is invoked by one of the parents. If the parents choose not to litigate
some provision of a custody agreement or arbitration award which has an adverse effect
on the child, the court is powerless to act. Yet these same parties, who are presump-
tively trusted to bring these matters to the court's attention, are viewed with extreme
distrust when they enter child custody agreements or submit themselves to arbitration
based thereon. Courts insist on reviewing such matters de novo, and they readily set
aside parental agreements or arbitral awards based on such agreements which they find
to be contrary to the child's "best interest." See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
105. E. FisHmi, DIvoRcE: THE NEw FREEDoM 3 (1974). See note 2 supra.
106. See M. RHEINSmN, MARRIAGE STABILrrY, DIVORcE, AND THE LAW 34 (1972);
Note, The No Fault Concept: Is This the Final Stage in the Evolution of Divorce?, 47
NOTRE DAME LAW. 959, 962-63 (1972).
107. See M. WHEELER, No-FAuLT DIVORCE 19-49 (1974); Note, supra note 106, at
962-63, 966-70.
108. Under Georgia's "no-fault" divorce statute, for example, GA. CODE ANN. § 30-
102(13) (Supp. 1975), a trial judge must grant a divorce on the pleadings where one
of the parties alleges that the marriage is "irretrievably broken." See McCoy v. McCoy,
236 Ga. 633, 225 S.E.2d 682 (1976).
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tion, it has been further argued that "state paternalism is inconsistent
with our historical and constitutional traditions,"'1 9 and that parents
have a fundamental right to control their children's development." 0
Finally, in areas involving relatively complex issues of fact, it is not
unusual for adjudicatory power to be delegated to a more specialized
tribunal, at least in the first instance. Many administrative agencies
are empowered to try cases and hear appeals with judicial review being
limited to determinations of whether the agency has acted within its
authority."1 While it is not suggested that the states establish regula-
tory agencies to deal with child custody and related questions, 112 it is
submitted that, as in the administrative law context, such issues involve
concepts with which trial judges are not normally familiar; 113 and that
courts therefore should give great weight to decisions reached by a
specialized arbitrator.
Nevertheless, it may be unrealistic to expect the courts to
surrender their traditional parens patriae jurisdiction. Since the proce-
dures proposed herein assure an alternative system that will in fact pro-
tect the best interests of the child, it is suggested that legislatures
amend their arbitration statutes to expressly include domestic disputes,
thereby subjecting the awards made in such cases to the less stringent
review given to the arbitration of commercial and labor matters." 4
109. Mnookin, supra note 23, at 266.
110. Id. at 266-67; Marschall & Gatz, supra note 87, at 51.
111. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AC'roN 263-66 (1965).
112. Although such an agency would undoubtedly develop sufficient expertise to han-
dle domestic disputes competently, the preservation of family autonomy, see notes 26-
28 supra and accompanying text, requires that the parents be permitted to select their
own expert.
113. See Foster & Freed, supra note 3, at 438; Watson, supra note 23. In most
states, custody determinations are made by courts of general jurisdiction. See, e.g., CAL.
Civ. CODE § 4351 (West Supp. 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 15(1) (c) (Supp. 1976).
But see N.Y. FAMmY Cr. Acr § 115(b) (McKinney 1963) (granting jurisdiction over
custody matters to a specialized domestic relations court in cases referred to it by the
supreme court). Lacking any particular expertise in these matters, the trial judge is
faced with a task which is "perhaps the most demanding which he must confront in the
course of his judicial duties." Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270, 272, 247 N.E.2d 659,
660, 229 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (1969).
The domestic dispute arbitrator, on the other hand, will have considerable expertise
in the field and will have demonstrated a particular interest in resolving custody-
related disputes. See note 41 supra. In addition, under the model proposed here he
will be called upon only after the parties have had the benefit of professional family
counseling. See notes 84-91 supra and accompanying text. Finally, unlike the judge
who is "selected" by the vagaries of docket scheduling, the arbitrator will have been
chosen by mutual consent of the parents. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying
text.




The currently accepted procedures for resolving child custody
disputes are clearly inadequate. Vesting unlimited authority in the
courts results in the making of sensitive social and psychological deter-
minations by judges whose expertise and experience in the field may
vary widely. Regardless of the judge's expertise, the important values
of family autonomy, privacy and rapid resolution will inevitably be
sacrificed to the structural imperatives of the judicial system.
While arbitration as it is currently practiced provides a far more
attractive alternative, its usefulness may be limited by the courts' in-
sistence on subjecting arbitral awards involving children to strict,
de novo review. The mediation-arbitration proposal suggested here
offers sufficient procedural certainty and substantive guarantees to en-
able innovative courts to reject the traditional view and expand upon
those few cases which have encouraged parental retention of ultimate
responsibility for decisions affecting their children. It is hoped, more-
over, that the use of a mediation-arbitration procedure tailored specifi-
cally to the needs of separating parents will significantly reduce the
incidence of dissatisfaction leading to court challenges of arbitration
decisions.
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